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Abstract 
The impact of performance funding on community college student outcomes is a 
contested issue. Performance funding policies in most U.S. states involve too small 
a proportion of funding to change college behavior. English further education 
colleges are similar to U.S. community colleges. 1992 policy reforms in England 
centralized policy control, and implemented a per-pupil funding formula; 10% of 
all funding is based on student success but other components of the funding 
formula pay colleges more money for enrolling disadvantaged students. This 
research uses five years of student level data to test the impact of these policies. 
Overall student success rates rose by 10% during the five-year period, with the 
largest gains made by ethnic minorities, adult basic education students, and 
students from disadvantaged neighborhoods. Although the English system depends 
on regulatory agencies that do not exist in the U.S., the major assertion of this 
research is that market-based funding policies—if properly designed—can promote 
equity in educational achievement. 
Keywords: performance funding, performance accountability, student success, 
community colleges 
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Financiamiento por desempeño y por equidad: Éxito de los estudiantes en 
escuelas de enseñanza superior inglesas. 
Resumen 
El impacto del financiamiento por desempeño en los resultados académicos de los 
estudiantes universitarios es una cuestión muy disputada. Las políticas de 
financiamiento por desempeño en la mayoría de los estados de EE.UU. son muy 
escasas como para tener un peso sustantivo en la modificación de políticas 
universitarias. Las escuelas de enseñanza superior inglesa son similares a las 
universidades comunitarias de EE.UU. En 1992 se aprobaron reformas a las 
políticas de control centralizado en Inglaterra y se comenzó a implementar una 
fórmula de financiamiento por estudiante: 10% de todo el gasto se basaba en el 
éxito del estudiante y otros componente otorgaban mas dinero a las universidades 
por inscribir estudiantes de grupos desfavorecidos. Esta investigación utiliza cinco 
años de información sobre los estudiantes para testear el impacto general de estas 
políticas. El nivel de éxito general de los estudiantes aumento en un 10% durante 
esos 5 años, con incrementos mayores en los estudiantes provenientes de minorías 
étnicas, adultos estudiando su escolaridad básica, y estudiantes de barrios 
desfavorecidos. Aun cuando el sistema inglés depende de agencias de control 
desconocidas en el caso de EE.UU. la afirmación mas importante de este estudio es 
que cuando están debidamente diseñadas, las políticas de financiamiento basadas en 
principios de mercado pueden promover equidad en los logros educacionales. 
 
 
 
Community colleges provide the pathway to a better career for students who lack the time, 
financial resources, or educational background to attend a four-year institution, but the benefits of a 
community college education are much greater for those who graduate from a degree or certificate 
program than those who dropout (Grubb, 2002). Unfortunately, national graduation rates for 
community college students are quite low. Six years after initial enrollment only 36% of community 
college students received any degree or certificate. The results are worse for African American and 
Hispanic students, 26% and 30%, respectively (U.S. Department of Education, 2002). 
The picture is much brighter in England. English further education colleges—referred to as 
further education colleges—are similar to U.S. community colleges—referred to as community 
colleges—in that they are the primary education providers for low income adults. Success rates in 
further education colleges—defined as whether or not a student successfully passes the qualification 
they are enrolled in - increased by an impressive 18% from the 1997–98 to 2003–04 academic year 
(Learning & Skills Council, 2004a, 2005). The gains were strongest for ethnic minorities, students 
from “deprived” areas, Adult Basic Education (ABE) students, and students with learning 
disabilities.1 How did England achieve these results? This article focuses on the role of performance 
funding and regulatory control, which are the components of its performance accountability system. 
                                                 
1 Deprived areas refer to geographic areas that receive high scores on a multidimensional index of 
deprivation (Learning & Skills Council, 2002). 
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Literature Review 
Performance accountability has been identified as one solution to the problem of 
unsatisfactory student outcomes in community colleges. Traditionally, accountability has focused on 
fulfilling legal requirements, such as civil rights legislation, whereas the contemporary accountability 
is focused on performance (Behn, 2001). Performance accountability refers to public policies which 
attempt to align college goals with government goals. Three categories of performance 
accountability are performance funding, performance budgeting, and performance reporting (Burke & 
Minassians, 2003). In performance funding, a portion of funding is directly tied to performance on 
key indicators through a funding formula. In performance budgeting, policymakers may consider 
performance on key indicators when considering funding allocations. In performance reporting, 
funding is not tied to performance, but public reporting of performance is theorized to create 
incentives for improvement. 
Recently U.S. state policy has moved away from performance funding in favor of 
performance reporting. In 2003, 15 states had performance funding programs compared to 17 in 
year 2000, 21 states had states performance budgeting programs compared to 28 in year 2000, and 
46 states had performance reporting programs compared to 30 in 2000 (Burke & Minassians, 2003). 
Some states are still experimenting with radical performance accountability programs. For example, 
Colorado has instituted a statewide voucher program in its higher education system. Instead 
allocating state funding to institutions, all students receive a flat-rate voucher which may be used 
towards tuition at any college or university (Harbour, Davies, & Lewis, 2006). 
There is a surprisingly small amount of research on the impact of performance 
accountability programs on community college student outcomes. One nine-state study by 
Dougherty and Hong (2005) found no relationship between the strength of performance 
accountability system and community college student outcomes relating to remediation, retention, 
graduation, transfer rates, and job placement. The study highlighted an important problem with 
performance funding; in isolation performance funding rewards a very limited number of outcomes 
to the detriments of other aspects of educational quality. Therefore, performance accountability can 
lead to unintended consequences such as a decline in academic standards and creating a disincentive 
to serve students who have lower likelihoods of success.  
U.S. literature on the impact of performance accountability on student outcomes is limited 
for several reasons. First, U.S. performance accountability policies generally involve too small a 
proportion in overall funding to induce behavioral changes in colleges. Second, research, especially 
cross-state studies, tends to oversimplify performance accountability systems. More attention should 
be paid to individual mechanisms within the system, and how these mechanisms interact with each 
other as a whole. Clearly, performance accountability policies can have unintended consequences, 
but are these consequences unavoidable or can they be overcome by regulatory agencies and a well-
designed system?  
This article provides insight into these issues by presenting results from a quantitative study 
on the impact of performance accountability on student outcomes in further education colleges. The 
funding system in England attempts to balance its strong funding component with additional 
funding for colleges that serve “disadvantaged” students.2 In addition, regulatory controls—
                                                 
 
2 “Disadvantaged” students are defined as students coming from “backgrounds which have 
disadvantaged them” (Learning & Skills Council, 2002), and are eligible for additional funding.  These include 
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specifically college inspection and external assessment of student work—are designed to overcome 
the perverse incentives created by performance funding. 
The two-part research question is, first, how has the structure of funding policy and 
regulatory control created incentives and mechanisms to increase student success? Second, what has 
been the impact of performance accountability on student success over time? Because the impact of 
performance funding is theorized result from the economic incentives it creates, the theoretical 
framework of quasi-markets provides a useful lens. The analysis of English policy is followed by 
statistical modeling using five years of student level data to ascertain the impact of policy on student 
success. The final section discusses policy implications for the U.S. 
Suitability of a U.S.—England Comparison 
A basic understanding of further education colleges is prerequisite for a comparison of U.S. 
and English policymaking. Further education colleges began as vocational training institutions and, 
in a country obsessed with class, were held in low regard by the more genteel echelons of society 
(Pratt, 2000). As educational opportunity reached a larger proportion of society, and as jobs 
increasingly required a stronger foundation of academic knowledge, enrollment in further education 
colleges skyrocketed and provision became a mix of academic and vocational instruction (Melville, 
2000). 
Today, more than 4 million students are enrolled in further education colleges (Learning & 
Skills Council, 2004b), out of a population of 50 million people (National Statistics, 2005a).3 By far 
the largest set of further education institutions are the general further education colleges, with 3 
million students enrolled in the 2003–04 academic year.4 The analyses presented in this article focus 
on general further education colleges, but will refer to them as further education colleges. 
Like community colleges, further education colleges have a mission to serve disadvantaged 
students. Both types of institution are the main education providers for low-income adults, students 
seeking vocational training, and students who need ABE, such as literacy instruction. In both 
countries, enrollment is highest for courses in business, information technology, and health care 
(Learning & Skills Council, 2004b; National Center for Educational Statistics, 2004). 
There are important differences as well. First, further education colleges typically offer 
qualifications, with coursework ranging from a few weeks to several years, as opposed to degrees. 
These qualifications resemble certificates offered by community colleges. For example, further 
education colleges offer full-time, full-year qualifications in database management, which are 
analogous to earning an advanced certificate in community colleges. Further education colleges 
generally do not offer degree programs, such as the Associate’s degree, and they generally lack the 
well-articulated transfer function that exists in Community colleges. 
                                                                                                                                                             
adult basic education students, those living in deprived areas, those with mental health problems or drug 
dependencies, political asylum seekers, and others (Learning & Skills Council, 2002). 
3 Further education colleges are one provider of English post-compulsory education, which ends at 
age 16. The other types are universities, work-based learning providers (apprenticeships), and adult and 
community learning centers.  
4 Further education colleges can be divided into four types: sixth-form colleges, which educate 16- to 
18-year-olds; specialist colleges, which focus on specific fields such as horticulture or performing arts; and 
general further education colleges.  
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Second, although 83% of students enrolled in further education are older than 18 (Learning 
& Skills Council, 2004b), further education colleges also educate a large proportion of the country’s 
16–18 year olds. Third, England has a strong national policymaking system, whereas in the U.S. each 
state has an autonomous community college policymaking framework (Education Commission of 
the States, 2000). Therefore, the policy implications from this English case-study relate to U.S. state 
policymaking, not federal policymaking. 
Theoretical Framework 
Quasi-markets provide a useful framework for understanding funding and regulatory control 
policies in England. Johnson (1999)  states that the four aspects of social services are strategy, 
funding, regulation, and provision. Generally, quasi-markets involve the separation of state finance 
from state provision, alongside the introduction of competition in the provision of services 
(Johnson, 1999; Walsh, 1995). Voucher systems in education are one example; funding follows 
students in their choice of schools, competition to attract students leads to increases efficiency (in 
theory), and institutions failing to attract enough students are forced to exit the market. 
Market based policies can be used to align the incentives of providers with the overall goals 
of central government. The principal-agent relationship plays a central role here: the principal 
(central government) pays the agent (individual colleges) to perform pre-specified services (Bartlett, 
Roberts, & Le Grand, 1998a). The principal must decide on the set of performance indicators to 
assess performance. Performance funding is generally resisted by colleges because it reduces budget 
stability, it undermines autonomy, and because the performance indicators chosen are often too 
simplistic to be valid measures of performance at college level. 
Analyzing the incentives created by principal-agent funding arrangements is central to the 
analysis of funding policy. The smaller the amount of performance funding and the greater the 
number of performance indicators this funding is divided by, the less incentive colleges have to 
improve their performance on these indicators. The ineffectiveness of performance funding in many 
U.S. states can be partially attributed to having too small an amount of funding tied to too many 
indicators (Burke & Minassians, 2003). 
Creating incentives for one kind of behavior can have unintended side effects. When 
performance is based on a single indicator—for example student success—providers have an 
incentive to focus their energy on that indicator, potentially at the expense of other activities that 
may be important to provision. Funding solely on the basis of student success would create strong 
incentives to lower academic standards. Additionally, performance funding for student success tends 
to exacerbate educational inequalities because colleges serving disadvantaged populations are likely 
to receive less performance funding than colleges serving affluent populations. Allocating additional 
funding for colleges that serve disadvantaged populations can help counterbalance this unintended 
side effect. 
Monitoring/regulation costs are the amount spent to ensure that agents (colleges) are acting 
in the interest of the principal (government). Monitoring costs decrease when the incentives of the 
agent are aligned with the incentives of the principal, or when both parties can agree on a shared 
mission. Similarly, when trust between the principal and agent increases, monitoring costs decrease. 
Monitoring costs increase when performance is difficult to measure and involves many outcomes.  
Walsh (1995)  describes a specific quasi-market form in which a central organization has 
control of overall strategy, and ultimate control of funding while semi-autonomous regulatory 
agencies are responsible for the different aspects of regulation. Monitoring costs are the costs 
incurred by these regulatory agencies. The idea is that the central organization “steers” but does not 
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“row” (Bartlett, Roberts, & Le Grand, 1998b). 1992 policy reforms in England created a similar 
policymaking system for further education colleges. The Department for Education and Skills 
(DfES) retained control of overall strategy; separate agencies, accountable to the DfES, became 
responsible for funding, inspection, and external assessment of student grades. The goal of these 
agencies was to ensure that agents (the colleges) act in the interest of the principal, the DfES. 
Funding Policy and Regulatory Control in England 
Overview of Policy Reform in English Further Education 
Before 1992, funding and policymaking for further education colleges was very similar to the 
current system used by California community colleges (Jaquette, 2005); colleges were funded 
through a combination of local property taxes and block grants from the national government to 
local education districts. These districts were responsible for hiring and firing, curriculum design, 
financial administration, and allocation of funds to individual colleges (McLure, 2000).  
In 1992 there were dramatic reforms in English further education. National legislation 
moved policymaking control from the local districts to the central government. Centralized 
regulatory agencies were created to regulate the different aspects of provision, such as funding, 
inspection, external assessment of student grades, etc. As a part of this effort, the new funding 
agency devised a performance-based per-pupil funding formula. Before this reform, block grant 
funding was given to local districts. After the reform, funding followed individual students to the 
college they decided to attend, essentially creating a national voucher system. The funding formula 
pays institutions additional funding for enrolling disadvantaged students and, currently, 10% of total 
funding depends on student success (Learning & Skills Council, 2002). The government created a 
centralized data system to track the progress of all students in the country and to allocate formula 
funding to institutions based on individual student progress. This data system, called the 
Individualized Learner Record, was the source of quantitative data used in this study. 
After the reform, each college became responsible for its own financial administration and 
solvency. These responsibilities had previously been the domain of local education authorities. 
Additionally, within each college, the lay board of governors was given increased oversight power of 
school finances and employment of senior management. Collectively, the 1992 reforms are 
commonly referred to as Incorporation Reform because they forced colleges to behave more like 
private corporations. 
The passage of Incorporation Reform legislation was quickly followed by a high-profile 
report entitled Unfinished Business which detailed the low retention and success rates under the 
prior further education funding and control framework (Audit Commission & Office for Standards 
in Education, 1993). The evidence from Unfinished Business was instrumental in securing the 
support of colleges during the implementation of the strong external accountability policies created 
in the Incorporation legislation (Davies & Rudden, 2000). 
The Per-Pupil Funding Formula 
This section utilizes the quasi-market framework to analyze Incorporation funding policies 
and regulatory agencies created incentives and mechanisms to increase student success rates. Table 1 
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below shows the total number of full time equivalent students (FTES) in all of English further 
education, as well as total funding, and average funding per FTES student.5 Total funding for 
further education has risen consistently since the 1999–00 academic year, while average funding per 
student peaked in the 2001–02 academic year.  
 
Table 1 
Full-time Equivalent Students (FTES) and Funding in Further Education Colleges, 1994–95—
2003–04 
Year FTES students Total funding ($millions) Average funding per FTES ($) 
1994–95 914,000 5,326 5,827 
1995–96 989,000 5,372 5,432 
1996–97 1,027,000 5,425 5,282 
1997–98 1,020,000 5,289 5,186 
1998–99 1,004,000 5,093 5,072 
1999–00 977,000 5,302 5,427 
2000–01 953,000 5,514 5,786 
2001–02 970,000 6,078 6,266 
2002–03 1,051,000 6,483 6,169 
2003–04 1,117,000 6,899 6,176 
Funding columns use constant 2002 £ converted using average 2002 exchange rate. 
Source: National Statistics (2005b).  
 
The per-pupil funding formula is the tool by which this funding is allocated from the central 
government to individual colleges. The formula was first implemented in the 1993–94 academic year 
(McLure, 2000). The funding formula would more precisely be called a per-qualification funding 
formula because colleges are paid on the basis of each qualification a student undertakes. However, 
throughout the paper I will refer to the per-pupil funding formula to stress the fact that funding 
follows each student. The amount calculated in the formula is intended to cover teaching as well as 
fixed costs such as building and equipment. To increase stability, colleges are guaranteed at least 
90% of previous year’s funding (Learning & Skills Council, 2002).  
Analysis of the funding formula is based on funding guidance documents sent from the 
central funding agency to individual colleges from 1998–2003 (Further Education Funding Council, 
1999b, 2000, 2001; Learning & Skills Council, 2002). Although there have been incremental changes 
from year to year, the formula remained largely the same until the 2002–03 academic year when the 
policy reforms of Blair’s Labour government took effect (Jaquette, 2005). Due to space limitations 
this article focuses on the most recent funding formula and not on how funding policy changed over 
time.6 The 2002–03 funding formula is presented in equation (1). Each of its components is 
explained in turn. 
 
                                                 
5 These funding amounts differ from funding calculations shown later in the paper, because later 
calculations are based on a subset of adult students, while Table 1 is based on all students in further education 
colleges, including 16–19 year old students. 
6 Detailed analyses of how the formula changed over time appear in Jaquette (2005). 
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2002–03 Funding Formula         (1) 
£ per qualification = [ (Base Rate - Achievement Funding) x Programme Weighting Factor x 
Disadvantage Uplift x London Weighting Factor] - Tuition + Additional Learning Support 
 
Base Rate = Base funding for each qualification 
Achievement Funding = Deduction valued at 10% of the base rate if the student fails 
Programme Weighting Factor = Higher weighting for more costly programs. (A=1, B= 1.12, C= 
1.3, D=1.6, E= 1.72, Adult Basic Education = 1.4) 
 
Disadvantage Uplift = Additional funding to reflect that some students require more resources 
than others (Postcode disadvantage uplift = 1.1 (on average), Homeless students disadvantage uplift 
= 1.12, All others = 1.1) 
 
London Weighting Factor = Additional funding to account for higher cost of provision in 
London (Central London = 1.18, Inner London = 1.12, Outer London = 1.06). 
 
Tuition = 25% of Base Rate. If the student is not eligible for tuition remission, then government 
funding is reduced by 25% of the base rate, and the student pays tuition directly to the college. If the 
student is eligible for tuition remission, than the government does not subtract tuition from college 
funding.  
 
Additional Learning Support = Additional funding for students with special learning needs. Value 
depends on needs of individual student. 
Source: Learning & Skills Council (2002).  
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Base rate. The base-rate is the core amount of funding for each qualification. This amount is 
predominantly determined by the number of guided learning hours (instructional hours) for that 
qualification.7 90% of base-rate funding is dependent on retention and 10% is dependent on student 
success. The academic year is divided into three funding periods and an institution receives retention 
funding for a qualification only if the student is present on the census date for that period. For 
example, imagine a student enrolled in a qualification that begins in September and ends in July. If 
that student drops out on December 15th (which is after the first census date but before the second 
census date) then the institution only receives 30% of base rate funding. Utilizing the quasi-market 
framework, the funding formula forces these public providers to focus their resources on student 
retention and achievement as opposed to initial enrollment. 
Achievement funding. Student success is valued at 10% of base-rate funding. For example, in 
2002–03 a qualification listed as having 440 guided learning hours had a base rate of £1,594 
(Learning & Skills Council, 2002). If the student successfully completes the qualification, then the 
institution receives the full £1,594 base-rate funding. If the student is present throughout the 
qualification, but does not pass examination, then the institution receives 90% of base-rate funding 
[(£1,594 – 10%*£1,594 = £1435)]. Before the 2002–03 academic year achievement funding fell into 
three categories: qualifications deemed relevant to the needs of the economy received achievement 
funding equivalent to 7% of total funding, other qualifications received 5% achievement funding, 
and certain qualifications (such as those not externally assessed) received no achievement funding 
(Further Education Funding Council, 1999b) (Further Education Funding Council, 2000, 2001). 
Beginning in the 2002–03 academic year all qualifications received 10% achievement funding. This 
represents a shift in funding emphasis toward student success and, in theory, gives colleges a 
stronger financial incentive to ensure their students are successful.8
Program weighting factor (PWF). Program weighting factors are another component of the 
funding formula in equation (1) above. These weighting factors give higher funding for provision 
that is deemed more costly. Table 2 below shows the different weighting factors. Providing medical 
technician training, for example, is more costly than teaching history and thus funding for students 
enrolled in these qualifications has a higher weighting factor.  
The goal of weighting factors is to eliminate the disincentive against providing costly 
provision. The funding formula presented in equation (1) shows that higher weighting factors are 
multiplied through achievement funding, which can lead to dramatic increases in total funding 
(Jaquette, 2005). Prior to the 2002–03 this was not the case; two qualifications with different 
weighting factors but the same instructional hours received the same achievement funding. 
Therefore, starting in 2002–03 institutions received a greater financial incentive increase success 
rates for qualifications that had higher weighting factors. 
                                                 
7 Base-rate funding for certain qualifications is listed explicitly as opposed to being determined by the 
number of guided learning hours. However, these amounts of base-rate funding for these listed courses do 
not differ greatly from the amount of funding they would receive had base-rate funding been determined by 
guided learning hours. 
8 Most qualifications consist of only a single component, but colleges can receive partial achievement 
funding when a single qualification has multiple components. For example, if a student enrolled in an 
Advanced Vocational Certificate of Education—one of England’s longer qualifications—successfully 
completes three out of the five modules, the college would receive three-fifths of the achievement funding. In 
the 2002–03 academic year, just 1.5% of the qualifications received partial achievement funding. An 
analogous program in the United States would pay achievement funding for each individual course a student 
successfully completed. 
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Table 2.  
Program Weighting Factors 
Factor Weight Example 
A 1 Accounting, history, economics, psychology 
B 1.12 Information technology, teacher training, dance, 
pharmacology, chemistry 
C 1.3 Hair styling, photography, catering, interior design, metallurgy 
D 1.6 Music technology, food preparation, animal care, engineering 
E 1.72 Gardening, fish production 
Adult Basic Education 
(ABE) 
1.4 Adult literacy, numeracy 
Source: Learning & Skills Council (2002).  
 
Table 2 shows that ABE qualifications receive higher program weighting. This policy is part 
of the Skills for Life initiative, which is a massive effort to increase adult literacy and numeracy 
(Department for Education and Employment, 2001). The higher weighting factor for ABE 
contributes to the initiative by increasing the financial incentive for colleges to serve these students.9
Disadvantage uplift. Performance funding was simultaneously implemented with several 
policy efforts to increase enrollment of low-income students (Kennedy, 1997). The disadvantage 
uplift is one of these policies. It pays institutions premium funding for enrolling disadvantaged 
students. The stated goal of disadvantage uplift funding in England is “to ensure that certain learners 
attract a funding enhancement, which reflects their relative disadvantage and the expected additional 
costs incurred by institutions in attracting and retaining such learners” (Learning & Skills Council, 
2002, p. 9).  
The funding formula presented in equation (1) shows that disadvantage uplift funding is 
multiplied through achievement funding. This creates a financial incentive to increase success rates 
for disadvantaged students. The disadvantage uplift was introduced in the 1998–99 academic year. It 
was initially applied to homeless students and students living in deprived postcodes (Kennedy, 
1997). Starting in the 1999–00 academic year the uplift was extended to adult basic skills students, 
students receiving means-tested benefits, those with mental health problems and drug dependencies, 
asylum seekers, refugees, ex-offenders, and others (Further Education Funding Council, 1999a) 
(Further Education Funding Council, 2000). Table 3 below shows that over time the average 
monetary value of the uplift increased as did the percentage of students receiving the uplift.  
 
                                                 
9 Adult basic education students have been defined as those who are “undertaking programmes 
where the primary learning goal is adult basic education or English for speakers of other languages” (Learning 
& Skills Council, 2002).   ABE qualifications refers to coursework in literacy, numeracy, access to further 
education, courses for students with learning disabilities, and other basic education.  Therefore, ABE students 
are those whose primary learning goal is ABE/ESOL, but they may take non-ABE qualifications in addition 
to ABE qualifications.  
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Table 3 
Disadvantage Uplift Mechanisms and Consequences, 1998–99—2002–03 
Effects 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 
Value of disadvantage uplift by student type a 
Postcode disadvantage uplift (average 
value) 
1.06 1.06 1.08 1.1 1.1 
Homeless and residential care 
disadvantage uplift 
1.09 1.09 1.12 1.12 1.12 
All othersa NA 1.06 1.08 1.1 1.1 
Percentage of students receiving disadvantage uplift by student typeb 
Postcode disadvantage uplift 29.2 26.9 26.7 26.1 29.1 
Any disadvantage uplift (including 
postcode) 
29.2 37.0 38.8 39.1 41.7 
Source: Jaquette (2005).  
a The following groups of students became qualified for a disadvantage uplift beginning in the 1999–
00 academic year: adult basic skills students, those receiving means-tested benefits, those with 
mental health problems, those recovering from alcohol or drug dependencies, political asylum 
seekers, political refugees, ex-convicts, those whose statutory education has been interrupted, those 
in or who have recently left mental or physical healthcare, those taking care of children/relatives as a 
full-time job.  
b The percentage of students receiving a disadvantage uplift was calculated using a sub-sample of the 
further education population. This sub-sample is defined in the quantitative modeling section to 
follow. 
 
Additional learning support. Additional learning support (ALS)—another component of the 
funding formula—is funding for special support in addition to what is normally provided in a 
standard learning program (Further Education Funding Council, 2000). ALS funding facilitates the 
employment of specialist staff including additional teachers to reduce class size (used especially in 
basic skills), personal care assistants, mobility assistants, readers, note-takers, and educational 
psychologists (Further Education Funding Council, 2001). The most common types of students 
utilizing ALS were basic skills students and those with sensory impairment, dyslexia, learning 
difficulties, or physical impairment (Faraday, Fletcher, & Gidney, 2000).  
ALS has existed since 1993. Two evaluations of ALS have stated that the program is very 
popular amongst providers because there is no limit to the amount of ALS funding an institution 
may receive for serving a single student and because ALS is funded on an uncapped, per-pupil basis 
by the central funding agency rather than by operating revenue of individual colleges (Faraday & 
Fletcher, 2003; Faraday et al., 2000). If, instead, each college was given a lump sum of ALS funding 
for all students, this could create a disincentive for enrolling students with costly support needs.  
In the 2002–03 academic year 9.3% of the population analyzed in this study received 
additional learning support. The average amount of ALS funding for each qualification receiving 
ALS (note that a single student can be enrolled in more than one qualification) was equivalent to 
$1080 using a January 2003 exchange rate (Jaquette, 2005). Logistic regression modeling, presented 
below, shows that the presence of ALS had a significant positive effect on the likelihood of student 
success, especially for disabled students and basic skills students (Jaquette, 2005). 
Tuition remission. Tuition fees are the final component of the funding formula. Generally, 
students are expected to pay their colleges a tuition fee equal to 25% of the national base rate for 
their qualification. Referring to the funding formula above, any tuition fees paid to the institution by 
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the student is deducted from the amount the central funding agency pays to the college. However, 
many students are eligible for tuition remission. If the student is eligible for tuition remission, the 
central funding agency does not deduct the tuition fee from the amount it pays the college. In the 
five years of data analyzed in this study, 29% of students paid full tuition fees. The rest were either 
eligible for tuition remission or the individual college decided to reduce or waive tuition costs as part 
of their internal policy. In this latter case, the institution does not receive tuition fees from either the 
student or the central funding agency. 
Regulating Further Education 
The potential unintended consequences of performance funding include lowering academic 
standards, restricting open access, and focusing resources only on the measurable outcomes which 
are subject to performance funding. Performance funding policies implemented in isolation of 
countervailing policies and institutions are more likely to exhibit these unintended consequences.  
In England several semi-autonomous government agencies help reduce these unintended 
side-effects and also put pressure on institutions to improve performance. This section discusses 
three important regulatory agencies in English further education, all of which are funded by and 
accountable to the Department for Education and Skills (DfES).  
The Learning and Skills Council. The Learning and Skills Council (LSC) is in charge of 
funding and planning further education, which includes administering the funding formula described 
above. The LSC was created under the Labour Government by the Learning and Skills Act of 2000 
(Department for Education and Employment, 1999). The predecessor to the LSC was the Further 
Education Funding Council (FEFC), which was created by the Conservative government in the 
wake of 1992 Incorporation Reform. There are important differences between these two 
organizations. First, while FEFC was responsible only for further education, the LSC expanded its 
policymaking remit to include work-based learning providers and adult community education 
learning providers as well. Second, while FEFC was responsible for inspection, LSC lost this 
inspection responsibility because the DfES wanted an arms-length relationship between funding and 
inspection.  
Third, under the FEFC enrollment growth was encouraged by market mechanisms. The 
entry funding element of the FEFC funding formula created a “grow or die” mentality for colleges 
leading to dubious recruitment practices (Ball, Maguire, & Macrae, 2000; Rospigliosi, 2000). When 
the Labour government came to power in 1997 market incentives for growth were reduced. The 
LSC funding formula introduced in 2002–03 eliminated entry funding and LSC satellite offices took 
a stronger role in planning enrollment growth at the local level. This exemplifies the shift away from 
free market policies and towards centralized planning. Therefore, LSC has a planning remit that the 
FEFC lacked. 
Inspection agencies. Inspection is seen by many to be the most influential regulatory force in 
English further education (G. Pine, personal communication, August 5, 2005). The Adult Learning 
Inspectorate and the Office for Standards in Education are jointly responsible for inspecting 
colleges. Inspection of colleges is guided by seven core questions, three of which relate directly to 
student success. Each college was inspected once between April 2001 and summer 2005 (Office for 
Standards in Education & Adult Learning Inspectorate, 2001).  
Inspection teams grade soft outcomes and processes to guard against the unintended 
consequence of colleges focusing resources only on performance funding measures. These include 
quality of instruction, student engagement, quality of their guidance counseling and tutoring services, 
fulfillment of equal-opportunity responsibilities, etc (Learning & Skills Development Agency, 2003; 
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Office for Standards in Education, 2002) Additionally, inspection teams review a sample of 
individual learning plans which colleges are required to create for each student (Learning & Skills 
Development Agency, 2003).  
Inspections have sharp teeth. Poor inspection grades for a particular program area can lead 
to a freeze in enrolment, the closing of that program area, and even closure of the institution. When 
college programs or services are deemed in need of improvement, they must develop action plans 
and report on their progress (Office for Standards in Education, 2002).  
Inspection is also a strategic mechanism used to increase student success. High or improving 
success rates are prerequisite for good inspection grades. Results of inspections are posted on the 
Office for Standards in Education website.10 This public report on performance creates an incentive 
for institutions to increase success rates in order to maximize institutional prestige. Additionally, 
several college principals have been fired by their local board of governors because of poor 
inspection results, which are largely dependent on improving success rates (G. Pine, personal 
communication, August 5, 2005). 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority. The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority is a 
regulatory agency that “maintains and develops the national curriculum… and accredits [externally 
assesses] and monitors qualifications in colleges and at work” (Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority, 2005).11 This study is primarily concerned with the external assessment role; exams and 
projects are sent to third-party graders who determine whether students pass the qualification and 
the grade that students receive. The guiding principle behind external assessment is that when 
institutions face strong pressure to increase student success, they should not determine what 
constitutes success. In the absence of external assessment colleges would have a strong incentive to 
lower academic standards in order to increase success rates. Therefore, external assessment helps 
ensure that gains in student success rates are not due to declining academic standards. 
Summary 
This section sought to address the first research question: how has the structure of funding 
policy and regulatory control created incentives and mechanisms to increase student success? 
Analysis of the per-pupil funding formula showed that institutions had a strong financial incentive to 
ensure their students were successful. In absence of other measures this could lead some colleges to 
restrict enrollment to students that had a high likelihood of success. However, the funding formula 
contained other components—specifically the disadvantage uplift and additional learning support—
which mediated against such enrollment restriction. Regulatory agencies were also shown to play a 
key role in reducing unintended consequences and catalyzing improvements in student success. The 
Department of Education and Skills controls the strategic goals of these agencies to ensure they 
compliment one another. In the next section I analyze five years of student level data to see whether 
funding policy and regulatory control was actually successful in raising student success rates. 
                                                 
10 This website has inspection reports for all FE colleges available at 
http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/reports/index.cfm?fuseaction=listColleges&type=fecollege.  
11 In England the process of using third-party graders to assess student work is external 
accreditation.  In this article I have replaced the term external accreditation with external assessment.  The 
rationale for this action is to reduce confusion for readers because in the U.S. the term accreditation refers to 
peer-evaluation of entire institutions, as opposed to external assessment of student work.  
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Descriptive Statistics and Modeling  
This section uses five years of student level administrative data to gain insight on the second 
research question: What has been the impact of funding and regulatory control on student success? 
A description of the data will be followed by analysis of descriptive statistics and regression 
modeling. Unfortunately, these analyses using data from 1998–99 to 2002–03 cannot fully answer 
the second research question because the data years analyzed postdate the dramatic policy reforms 
implemented beginning in 1993. Additionally, incremental changes in funding policy and regulation 
have often been implemented simultaneously with changes in the national curriculum, changes in 
teacher training, etc. which lie outside the already wide scope of this research. However, these are 
shortcomings which plague most analyses that are not experimental in nature. 
There is another reason to be cautious results which attempt to isolate the effect of specific 
funding policies on student success; these policies are intended to work in concert rather than 
isolation from one another. Disadvantage uplift funding and additional learning support funding are 
intended to offset the additional financial burden of helping disadvantaged students become 
successful. The grading system used by the inspection regime is intended to give colleges the 
incentive to focus resources on increasing student success. Indeed, a major criticism of performance 
accountability efforts in U.S. states is that they tend to be tacked on to existing systems without 
thought to how policies reinforce or conflict with one another. Therefore, when thinking about 
what drives trends in success rates, readers are encouraged to think holistically about the incentives 
and checks and balances created by the entire funding and regulatory system.  
Data and Sample 
The following analyses are based on student level administrative data from 1998–99 to 
2002–03 academic years for the entire population of further education students. The data have never 
before been used in academic research. Further education reform in 1992 mandated that all colleges 
return data for all students. The resulting dataset is called the Individualized Learner Record (ILR), 
which is similar to student data tracking systems which exist in most U.S. states. The data is 
qualification level data rather than student level data because an individual enrolled in three 
qualifications would have three observations in the ILR.  
Several additional datasets were merged with the ILR. First, institution level data was 
retrieved from an LSC administrative dataset. Secondly, ILR data was merged with data from the 
Learning Aim Database12 to get qualification level variables, including the program weighting factor. 
Third, data on local area population density and local area educational attainment were retrieved 
from the 2001 UK census. Finally, the English Indices of Deprivation 2004 were merged to the ILR 
by student postcode. These indices combine seven measures of deprivation (income deprivation, 
                                                 
12 The Learning Aim Database provides information on qualifications and learning aims for 
institutions. The software provided by the Learning Aim Database is used by colleges to determine how 
much funding they will receive for each qualification. The Learning Aim Database Website is 
http://providers.lsc.gov.uk/lad/default.asp  
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crime deprivation, housing deprivation) into a single index, which shows how deprived a local area 
is.13  
Variables were chosen for the following analysis based on a literature review of factors that 
influence adult student success rates (Alfonso, Bailey, & Scott, 2005; Bailey et al., 2004; Davies, 
2001; Davies & Rudden, 2000; Grubb & Lazerson, 2004; Martinez, 2001; St. John, 1999). These 
factors were divided into individual demographic determinants (such as ethnicity, gender), 
qualification level determinants (such as difficulty level, mode of instruction), institution level 
characteristics (such as number of students, and population density of college geographic area), and, 
finally, funding determinants (Jaquette, 2005). These funding determinants were based on the above 
analysis of funding policy, and are the main determinants of interest. Unfortunately, key variables 
such as previous educational attainment, parental income, and parental education were not present 
in the ILR. 
The population was restricted to one that would be most comparable to American 
community colleges. The sample kept students from General Further Education Colleges and 
Tertiary Colleges, dropping sixth-form colleges (which educate 16–18 year olds), specialist colleges 
(for example horticulture, or drama colleges), external providers, and work-based learning providers 
(apprenticeships). This analysis only retained students who were 19 or older at the beginning of the 
academic year. Because the analysis of funding policy focused on the funding policies under the 
FEFC/LSC, qualifications not funded by FEFC/LSC were dropped. Qualifications in franchised 
provision were dropped in order to focus on a more homogenous group of providers.14 Additionally 
the sample only kept students on courses of 20 or more guided learning hours. The rationale was to 
exclude “taster courses” and other courses that would be expected to have high success rates due to 
their short duration. 
The data was further limited to qualifications where student success was known. 
Observations were deleted if the qualification was continuing to the next academic year, if the exam 
results were unknown, or if the students were partially successful. To illustrate, in the 2002–03 ILR 
data student success was known for 86.5% of qualifications. This 86.5% would be kept in the 
sample. Of the remaining 13.5%, 1.5% had partial achievement, 2.5% exam not taken/result not 
known, and 9.5% qualification continuing to the next academic year. There was right censoring, but 
not left censoring; a student who started a two-year course in year X-1 would be dropped from the 
data in year X-1, but would appear in year X when their outcome was known. This ensures that 
there is no duplication of student qualifications from one year to the next.  
Observations in the analysis dataset have three possible outcomes: first, they withdrew from 
the course; second, they were present throughout the duration of the qualification (this is called 
retention), but failed to pass examination; third, they were present throughout the qualification, and 
                                                 
13 The 2004 Indices of Deprivation were commissioned by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
to the Social Disadvantage Research Centre at the Department of Social Policy and Social Work at Oxford 
University. The Indices of Deprivation are based on the idea that distinct measures of deprivation can be 
measured at the output area level and aggregated into an index that measures the total amount of deprivation 
experienced by individuals living in a particular super output area. Each super output area has about 1,500 
people. The seven domains of deprivation are: income deprivation; employment deprivation; health and 
disability deprivation; education, skills and training deprivation; barriers to housing and services, living 
environment deprivation, and crime deprivation.  These indices are different from the ones which are used to 
determine whether students receive a postcode disadvantage uplift. 
14 Franchised provision is when an institution contracts an external provider to provide instruction 
on behalf of the institution. 
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they successfully passed examination. The analyses presented here only consider the binary outcome 
called success, where 0 = withdrawn or failed examination, 1 = passed examination. Analyses of 
student retention can be found in Jaquette (2005) . 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 on the next page shows success rates for the overall population and for sub-groups 
from the 1998–99 to 2002–03 academic year. In the appendix, Table A-1 shows the corresponding 
sample sizes. Overall success rates increased by 10% over this time period and the gains were 
distributed fairly equally over time, growing by 2.8%, 2.3%, 2.2% and 2.7% in each respective year.  
Subgroup analysis shows which groups made the strongest gains. The local level of 
deprivation is analyzed first. A higher deprivation score means that the student comes from a more 
deprived postcode. Looking down the columns, less deprived areas are always associated with higher 
success rates, but looking across the rows the biggest gains over time were made by students in 
highly deprived areas. This result suggests that the achievement gap between affluent and deprived 
areas is decreasing over time.  
Looking next at ethnicity, 2002–03 non-whites made up 26% of the sample as compared to 
22% in 1998–99.15 White and Indian students generally have the highest success rates. The overall 
picture is that gains were strong for all ethnic groups, with the white vs. non-white achievement gap 
closing over time, from 7% in 1998–99 to 5% in 2002–03.16 It is important to note that non-whites 
are making these gains despite residing in more highly deprived areas. For example, in this study 
Bangladeshis had the highest average level of deprivation and their success rates increased by 20%. 
The findings for deprivation and ethnicity are important considering research in the United States, 
which indicates ethnic minorities and deprived students persistently have low and stagnant success 
rates (Bailey et al., 2004).  
Looking next at gender, women generally have higher success rates than men. However, 
success rates for women have increased by 9%, while success rates for men have increased by 12%. 
Looking next at age, older students have higher success rates and stronger gains over time than 
younger students. 
The next set of variables focus on the type of qualification a student enrolls in (a single 
student can enroll in multiple qualifications). The variable qualification level is a measure of course 
difficulty as determined by the Qualification and Curriculum Authority.17 The gains are strongest for 
“other” and level 1, which are generally low level qualifications.18  
 
                                                 
15 Author’s calculation. 
16 Author’s calculation. 
17 Note that we cannot make a valid comparison to the 2002–03 data because the level assigned to 
some courses was changed as part of the transition towards a national qualification framework.  
18 Other qualification variables, such as area of learning (i.e. science, business, construction, etc) and 
qualification type (i.e. A-level, NVQ, GNVQ, etc) are included in Jaquette (2005). Critics have state that the 
rise in success rates is due to declining rigor in new curriculum. Jaquette (2005) devotes considerable attention 
to this assertion but finds that this is not the case. 
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Table 4 
Qualification Success Rates, 1998–99 to 2002–03 
Population 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03
Overall  56.9 59.7 62.0 64.2 66.9 
Deprivation Index      
Deprivation LT 10 60.9 62.6 64.4 66.8 69.4 
Deprivation 10-<20 59.5 61.8 63.9 65.9 68.7 
Deprivation 20-<30 56.6 59.4 61.7 63.7 66.7 
Deprivation 35-<50 52.9 56.8 59.4 61.5 64.5 
Deprivation 50+ 49.4 54.2 57.6 60.1 62.9 
Ethnicity      
Bangladeshi 46.6 51.5 57.2 61.1 67.0 
Black-African 44.4 51.8 53.7 56.9 59.5 
Black-Caribbean 46.3 50.3 53.1 56.3 57.5 
Black-Other 45.2 48.3 51.7 55.2 56.8 
Chinese 52.2 56.4 59.5 63.1 67.9 
Indian 55.5 59.0 60.4 64.5 68.3 
Pakistani 48.9 52.0 50.3 58.1 60.8 
White 58.4 61.1 63.0 65.7 68.3 
Asian-Other 51.3 55.7 58.8 61.4 62.3 
Gender      
Male 53.0 56.4 59.4 61.8 64.6 
Female 59.3 61.7 63.5 65.7 68.4 
Age      
Age 19–25 52.1 54.7 55.4 57.1 60.2 
Age 26–34 56.8 59.9 62.4 64.6 66.3 
Age 35–44 60.8 63.4 65.9 67.7 69.6 
Age 45–54 59.7 62.1 65.2 67.2 70.5 
Age 55+ 54.8 57.9 61.5 65.5 70.9 
Disabled 56.6 62.1 63.3 65.5 70.1 
Qualification levela      
Entry & level 1 55.7 59.1 60.7 64.0 68.5 
Level 2 55.2 58.1 59.7 61.3 62.6 
Level 3 55.1 57.8 60.6 62.6 64.5 
Level 4 or Higher 54.3 50.2 51.3 54.7 60.3 
Other 61.9 68.9 71.7 71.7 76.9 
External assessment      
Not externally assessed 60.0 65.9 71.0 74.3 75.9 
Externally assessed 56.1 59.0 60.8 62.0 63.9 
Qualification duration      
LT 24 Weeks 66.0 67.0 70.2 73.6 74.9 
24-<48 Weeks 53.8 57.6 58.1 59.5 62.1 
48+ Weeks 46.6 47.8 52.0 50.4 56.5 
Mode of attendance      
Full-time, full-year 56.7 59.9 57.2 58.0 62.2 
Full-time, part-year 66.2 69.6 71.9 74.8 75.5 
Part-time 56.3 58.9 62.3 64.6 67.3 
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Population 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03
Open/distance learning 44.1 47.8 50.8 47.3 52.0 
Funding Determinants      
Receive access funding   57.2 59.1 65.0 
Postcode disadvantage uplift 52.0 55.6 58.4 60.4 63.7 
On benefit 50.1 53.1 55.2 58.2 60.3 
ABE student 55.8 64.4 70.0 73.1 72.8 
Asylum seeker 47.8 51.1 59.1 58.4 57.5 
Additional Learning Support 61.4 65.6 66.3 69.3 73.8 
N 1,509,393 1,687,464 1,692,394 1,646,138 1,771,842
a Percentages for 2002–03 not comparable to previous years due to change in definitions. 
 
External assessment has special theoretical importance to this research; when institutions 
face such strong pressure to increase success rates, the cheapest solution is to institute more lenient 
grading policies. However, colleges do not have this power when standards are controlled by the 
national curriculum authority and student success rates are determined by external graders. 
Generally, about 80% of qualifications analyzed in this study were externally assessed. Over the five 
year period success rate gains for non-externally assessed qualifications were 16% compared to 8% 
for externally assessed qualifications. Therefore, non-externally assessed qualifications have higher 
success rates are higher and make stronger gains over time, but are not the driving force in overall 
success rate gains because they represent a minority of the population. 
The final set of variables in table 4 focuses on qualifications which were subject to additional 
funding initiatives. Most of these funding initiatives—whether they were aimed at the college or 
directly to the student—focused on students who historically have had low success rates. Access 
Funding is given directly to students who are low income or in receipt of means tested benefit and 
can be used to offset the childcare costs, transportation costs, books and equipment, and 
examination fees. In theory, such programs help adult students balance work, family obligations, and 
education (Grubb & Lazerson, 2004). Access funding was not implemented nationally until the 
2000–01 academic year. Success rates for students receiving access funding grew 8% over the three 
years of data.19
The postcode disadvantage uplift is a disadvantage uplift for students who live in a deprived 
postcode. Between the academic years 1998–99 and 2002–03 success rates for students receiving a 
disadvantage-postcode uplift increased by 11.7% compared to 10% for the national average. This 
finding may be especially important for policymakers. Research on Community colleges has found it 
is difficult to increase success rates for disadvantaged students (Bailey, Calcagno, Jenkins, Kienzl, & 
Leinbach, 2005; Grubb & Lazerson, 2004). Further education colleges, however, are given a dual 
financial incentive to serve these students and ensure that they are successful. The value of the 
disadvantage uplift increased from an average of 6% of total funding in 1998–99 to 8% in 2000–01 
to 10% in 2002–03. Furthermore, as explained in the previous section, the total value uplift funding 
is increased when students are successful.  
                                                 
19 In analysis restricted to students receiving means tested benefits, those receiving access funding 
had higher success rates than those not receiving access funding (Jaquette, 2005). Therefore, when restricting 
analysis to students which are—theoretically—eligible for access funding, those that actually receive access 
funding have higher success rates. 
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Students receiving means tested benefits and political asylum seekers have been eligible for 
fee remission—a funding policy directed at the student—in all years studied. Beginning in 1998–99 
both groups began receiving disadvantage uplift funding at 6% of total funding. This amount rose to 
8% in 2000–01, and to 10% in 2002–03. Therefore, these students receive direct financial support 
(no-tuition), and in addition institutions are paid more money for serving these students. Although 
the success rates remain below the national average, both groups showed gains of 10% which is 
significant considering the special challenges facing these disadvantaged students.  
ABE students have benefited from a number of financial incentives aimed at both students 
and providers. To summarize, they received tuition remission since 1998–99,20 beginning in 1999–00 
they became eligible for a disadvantaged uplift, and beginning in 2002–03 ABE qualifications 
received a higher program weighting. ABE students were also eligible to receive additional learning 
support. Over the five years studied success rates for ABE students increased by 17%. 
Finally, students receiving Additional Learning Support (ALS) have much higher success 
rates than those not receiving ALS. ALS students also make stronger gains over time. Further 
subgroup analysis shows that this result is partly explained by the fact that ALS students are more 
likely to be enrolled in non-externally assessed qualifications (Jaquette, 2005). However, even after 
controlling for external assessment, ALS is strongly associated with higher success rates as shown in 
the following regression results. 
Simulating the funding formula. The per-pupil funding formula was simulated by combining 
student level data from the Individualized Learner Record with the rules from funding policy 
documents (Further Education Funding Council, 1999b, 2000, 2001; Learning & Skills Council, 
2002).21 Figure 1 below shows funding per instructional hour for select student groups from 1998–
99 to 2002–03 using constant 2002 £ converted using average 2002 exchange rate. Because this 
research focused on incentives created by funding policy, Figure 1 shows how much money 
institutions receive for each student if the student is successful. 
Figure 1 yields several important results. First, average funding for all students rose steadily 
from $8.7 per instructional hour in the 1998–99 academic year to $10.4 per instructional hour in 
2002–03. Second, colleges receive more funding for students with higher resource needs. Students 
receiving a disadvantage uplift are funded 7% higher on average than those that do not receive a 
disadvantage uplift. ABE students are funded 30% more and average than non-ABE students.22 
Students receiving additional learning support receive nearly twice the funding on average as 
compared to those that do not receive additional learning support. Funding per instructional hour 
for ABE students receiving additional learning support (not shown) and disabled students receiving 
additional learning support (not shown) is even higher. In conclusion, the per-pupil funding formula 
                                                 
20  Tuition remission was the ILR variable used to identify basic skills learners. 
21 Details on the construction of the simulation can be found in the appendix of the full report 
(Jaquette, 2005). 
22 It may appear contradictory that funding for ABE students fell in 2002–03, the same year that the 
Skills for Life initiative came into effect.  The reason for this is as follows: the new funding formula which 
came into effect in 2002–03 assigned a program weighting factor of 1.4 for ABE students.  This weighting 
factor was only applied to ABE qualifications that followed the new ABE national curriculum which came 
into effect in 2002–03 (Department for Education and Skills, 2003b).  However, colleges were considerably 
confused about this policy and only a minority of ABE students were actually enrolled in qualifications that 
met the new national curriculum (Learning & Skills Council, 2003). 
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which emphasizes student success, allocates additional funding for students that need more 
resources to become successful. 
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Figure 1. Funding per instructional hour, 1998–99 to 2002–03, using constant 2002 £ converted 
using average 2002 exchange rate  
Statistical Modeling 
The preceding trends in success rates by subgroup are partially driven by their correlation 
with particular variables. Modeling helps control for the effect of other variables. The analyses 
presented below utilize logistic regression modeling. The model was built in stages, adding student-
level socioeconomic determinants first, followed by qualification-level determinants, institution-level 
determinants, and finally funding-determinants. Table 5 below shows selected variables from the 
final model in which all variables were included. Due to space constraints, results of following 
variables appear in Table A-2 (in the appendix): geographic region, area of learning, qualification 
type, institution size, population density, and program weighting. The results for all models are 
shown in the appendices of Jaquette (2005) which can be obtained by the author upon request. 
Table 5 shows odds ratios and p-values for selected variables. The odds ratios show the odds 
of success compared to that of the reference group, controlling for other factors. An odds ratio 
greater than one means that group is more likely to be successful than the reference group, while an 
odds ratio of less than one means that group is less likely to be successful than the reference group. 
P-values are measures of statistical significance. With sample sizes so large, most effects are highly 
significant. Therefore, the value of the odds ratio gives a better indication of whether one group has 
significantly higher or lower success rates than another. 
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Table 5 
Odds Ratios for Student Success Logistic Regression 
Variable 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 
Deprivation index (ref= LT 10)      
Deprivation 10-<20 0.96*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94***
Deprivation 20-<30 0.90*** 0.88*** 0.86*** 0.88*** 0.89***
Deprivation 30-<50 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.78*** 0.81*** 0.82***
Deprivation 50+ 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.71*** 0.75*** 0.77***
Female 1.25*** 1.20*** 1.20*** 1.18*** 1.21***
Disabled 0.93*** 0.98 0.93*** 0.89*** 0.97***
Ethnicity (ref= white)      
Asian-other 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.77***
Bangladeshi 0.81*** 0.75*** 0.80*** 0.83*** 0.92***
Black-African 0.74*** 0.82*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.74***
Black-Caribbean 0.72*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.71***
Black-other 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.69***
Chinese 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.87***
Indian 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.95*** 1.00 
Pakistani 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.64*** 0.77*** 0.81***
Age (ref= 19–25)      
Age 26–34 1.17*** 1.20*** 1.25*** 1.28*** 1.26***
Age 35–44 1.28*** 1.32*** 1.39*** 1.44*** 1.44***
Age 45–54 1.17*** 1.21*** 1.30*** 1.38*** 1.45***
Age 55+ 0.93*** 1.05*** 1.13*** 1.27*** 1.43***
Qualification levela (ref= level 1)      
Level 2 1.09*** 1.02*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.91***
Level 3 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.15*** 1.09*** 1.00 
Level 4 & 5 1.07*** 0.80*** 0.75*** 0.78*** 0.86***
Other Level 1.49*** 1.48*** 1.37*** 0.92*** 1.47***
Externally assessed 0.82*** 0.88*** 0.92*** 0.68*** 0.70***
Mode of Attendance (ref= full-time full-year)     
Full-time Part-year 1.06*** 1.14*** 1.32*** 1.47*** 1.29***
Part-time 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.99 1.06*** 0.96***
Qualification duration (ref= LT 24 weeks)     
24-<48 Weeks 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.63*** 0.56*** 0.61***
48+ Weeks 0.51*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.38*** 0.47***
Open/Distance Education 0.64*** 0.79*** 0.65*** 0.50*** 0.55***
Funding Determinants      
Postcode disadvantage uplift 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.97*** 0.98***
Additional learning support 1.31*** 1.26*** 1.24*** 1.43*** 1.52***
Access funding   1.00 0.98 1.13***
Means tested benefit  0.69*** 0.71*** 0.75*** 0.80*** 0.73***
ABE students 0.81*** 0.91*** 1.08*** 1.08*** 1.16***
Asylum seeker 0.85*** 0.71*** 0.90*** 0.82*** 0.80***
N 1,244,985 1,608,931 1,622,600 1,629,278 1,771,656
Pseudo R2 .09 .079 .084 .104 .096 
Number of Parameters 74 74 75 75 75 
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Table 5 notes: 
Results for geographic region, area of learning, qualification type, institution size, population density, 
and program weighting not shown. See Table A-2 in appendix for full model. 
a Percentages for 2002–03 not comparable to previous years due to change in definitions for how 
qualification level was defined. 
b The reference group for each funding determinant is qualifications not having that characteristic. 
For example, the odds ratio for Additional Learning Support shows the regression adjusted odds of 
success in comparison to qualifications that do not receive Additional Learning Support. 
c The access funding program did not begin until the 2000–01 academic year 
* p<.01, ** p<.001, *** p<.0001 
 
Regression models were run separately for each academic year. Therefore, year to year 
comparisons should be made with caution. Recall that success rates increased by 10% over the five 
year period. If the odds ratio for a particular subgroup remains the same from year to year, it does 
not mean that the odds of success for that subgroup did not change from the previous year. Rather, 
it means that compared to the reference group, the subgroup has the same likelihood of success 
compared to the reference group as it did in the previous year. Comparing odds ratios over time for 
a particular row can, however, show how success rates for that group changed over time compared 
to the reference group. If a particular subgroup consistently had an odds ratio of .8, this means that 
their odds of success are lower than the reference group but that their gains in success rates are 
keeping pace with that of the reference group.  
Regression results in Table 5 show findings similar to the descriptive statistics. First, for level 
of deprivation, the odds ratios are all lower than one. This makes intuitive sense; it means that, after 
controlling for other factors, success rates are higher for the lowest deprivation band, which is the 
reference group. However, the odds ratios for the high deprivation groups get larger in each year, 
meaning that, controlling for other variables, success rates for more deprived students are catching 
up to success rates for less deprived students. The same can be said about ethnic minorities in 
comparison to white students, which are the reference group; despite having lower success rates in 
each year (exhibited by odds ratios less than one), odds ratios for ethnic minorities generally grow 
higher each year. 
There are several notable differences between the descriptive statistics and the regression 
results. When the model is run without qualification level variables (not shown), the odds ratios for 
high deprivation bands increase, which shows that these students are disproportionately enrolled in 
low-level qualifications which have higher success rates for all students (Jaquette, 2005). This line of 
thinking can be employed to explain the results for other sub-groups; Bangladeshis have higher odds 
ratios than whites (reference group) when only socioeconomic variables such as deprivation are 
included. This is because Bangladeshis are disproportionately living in high deprivation areas, a 
characteristic correlated with low success rates. However, the odds ratios for Bangladeshis decline 
once qualification level variables are added because Bangladeshis are disproportionately enrolled in 
entry level qualifications which have high success rates for all students. Such analysis shows the 
value of statistical modeling over descriptive statistics. 
Moving to age, even after controlling for other variables, such as difficulty level and 
qualification duration, older students have much higher success rates than younger ones. 
Additionally, longer course duration and open/distance education are both associated with lower 
success rates. As predicted in the analysis of funding policy, qualifications that were externally 
assessed had lower rates of success than non-externally assessed qualifications. The strength of this 
trend increased over time. 
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Externally assessed qualifications much lower odds of success than externally non-externally 
assessed qualifications. These findings support the statement that funding for achievement can lead 
to a decline in academic standards. At the same time, this decline is not inevitable. External 
assessment precludes this possibility.  
This study is centrally concerned with funding determinants which are shown at the bottom 
of Table 5. Here, results for the individual components of the funding formula are shown, because it 
proved difficult to model the entire funding formula in any meaningful way. Institutions received 
financial rewards (described above) for increasing the success rates of students on means tested 
benefits, asylum seekers, and students receiving a postcode disadvantage uplift. Despite having odds 
ratios less than one, success rates for these students kept pace with the strong gains of their 
respective reference groups.23  
Success rates for ABE students increased over time, and were especially strong in 2002–03 
with an odds ratio of 1.16. This means that ABE students made strong gains in comparison to non-
ABE students, who were the reference group. This is an important finding considering the number 
of funding initiatives which have been aimed at ABE students. The positive results for ABE 
students are stronger (1.24 odds ratio in 2002–03) when external assessment is not included in the 
model (model not shown). This is because ABE students were disproportionately enrolled in non-
externally assessed qualifications. 
The results for students receiving Additional Learning Support (ALS) are even stronger. ALS 
has a large, positive impact on the odds of success, and this effect has grown over time. For example 
in 2002–03 students receiving ALS were 1.52 times more likely to be successful than those not 
receiving ALS. When external assessment is not included in the model, the odds ratio rises slightly to 
1.55. The results for ABE students and ALS students are positive from a policy perspective. They 
suggest that financial policies targeted at institutions can help increase student success rates. 
Conclusion: Policy Learning for U.S. Community Colleges? 
To summarize, overall success rates for the population analyzed rose by 10% over a five year 
period. Gains were especially strong for ABE students, disadvantaged students, and those in need of 
additional learning support. How was this achieved? This study has focused on the role of funding 
policy and regulatory control. 1992 Incorporation Reform created a quasi-market in further 
education. Utilizing the theoretical discussion of quasi-markets, government policy generally sought 
to retain public providers, but created incentives for these providers to act competitively. These 
colleges became responsible for their own financial solvency. Colleges were given performance 
funding contracts. Institutions only receive funding if they are able to attract students. If their 
students dropped out or were not successful, funding would decrease. Additionally, high or 
improving success rates were prerequisite for “good inspection grades,” which in turn determined 
the job security of a college’s senior management.  
The quantitative analyses presented yield optimistic results. We are not powerless in the face 
of socioeconomic factors. The unintended consequences of performance accountability are not 
inevitable. External assessment can protect against declining academic standards. A disadvantage 
                                                 
23 In order to check for high collinearity between “level of deprivation” and students receiving a 
“postcode disadvantage uplift,” an additional model (not shown) was run without “level of deprivation.” The 
results for this model were very similar to the model shown. 
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uplift can protect against the disincentive against enrolling students with higher resource needs. 
Inspection can protect against the incentive to focus resources only on a small number of outcomes. 
However, it would be difficult to incorporate these policies to U.S. states. Five reasons are 
listed. First, all public funding for English further education comes from the central government, 
while public funding for community colleges comes from federal, state and local governments. From 
an organizational theory perspective, the more that organizations in a sector rely on a single funding 
source, the more leverage that funding source has to demand performance (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Scott & Meyer, 1991). The relative dilution of public funding sources for community colleges 
and the small amount of funding devoted to performance makes it unlikely that performance 
funding will be sufficient to induce behavioral change in community colleges. 
Second, a fundamental priority of any organization is survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Voucher funding systems, which use the threat of market-exit as an inventive for increased 
efficiency, inherently increase budget instability in comparison to traditional “base + enrollment 
growth + inflation” funding policies. On Incorporation Day (April 1, 1993) there were 465 further 
education colleges but by 2003 there were only 435 colleges due to mergers and closures (Cope, 
Goodship, & Holloway, 2003). Such closures would not be tolerated in the U.S. because the 
American Association of Community Colleges is much stronger than its English counterpart, The 
Association of Colleges. 
Third, although the equity components of the per-pupil funding formula would be 
supported by champions of social justice the U.S. political climate that increasingly values merit 
funding over need-based funding. Furthermore, need-based funding policies in the U.S. are usually 
eroded over time by political pressure to cater to middle-class voters, as has been the case with 
Federal Pell Grants (Callan, 2001) and the Georgia Hope Scholarship (Henry & Rubenstein, 2002). 
Fourth, the English brand of performance funding could not be imported to the U.S. 
because English qualifications are generally much shorter and more discrete than U.S. degrees. 
Interestingly, the English system provides performance funding when students successfully pass 
sub-components of a single qualification (Learning & Skills Council, 2002). By contrast, U.S. 
performance funding entire degrees (which can take community college students upwards of six 
years to complete) seems ridiculous. A U.S. performance funding system analogous to the English 
system would provide performance funding for each individual course successfully completed, but 
lack of external assessment would make such a policy problematic. 
Fifth, the U.S. lacks the strong regulatory agencies that underpin the English system. Perhaps 
the most intractable obstacle to importing English policies is the fundamental difference between 
the U.S. and English welfare states. England regulates further education through a sophisticated 
bureaucracy of state-owned regulatory agencies. The Department for Education and Skills controls 
overall strategy and can continually reorganize the regulatory agencies under its remit so that their 
individual missions balance the sector on the whole. Other areas of English social policy, such as 
welfare and unemployment benefits, operate similarly (Cope et al., 2003).  
The U.S., by contrast, has a much smaller welfare state, and historically relies on voluntary 
agencies to regulate social policy. In his 19th century observations of America Alexis de Tocqueville 
said “Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations…. 
Wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government in France, or a man of rank 
in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association” (Tocqueville, 1862, p. 198). 
Accreditation of postsecondary education institutions provides an example of one such voluntary 
agency. Accreditation is America’s substitute for English inspection and external assessment. 
However, accreditation associations are run by college and university presidents. This violates the 
English principle that regulation and provision should have an arms-length relationship. U.S. 
accreditation associations cannot be expected to hold a tough line with regard to performance 
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accountability standards, especially when public funding is at stake. In absence of strong state 
regulatory agencies, performance funding for student success is likely to decrease academic 
standards. 
A frequent lesson from international comparative policy research is that individual social 
policies work because they are buoyed by a complex welfare state and social structure that has 
evolved over time in that particular country (Esping-Anderson, 1990). Wholesale policy borrowing 
rarely works. However, certain components of English policymaking may be more feasible in some 
states than others. Florida, for instance, has a strong regulatory environment and 69% of community 
college operating revenue comes from the state (Education Commission of the States, 2000), a trait 
that permits considerable leverage to demand performance. 
Despite these heavy-handed caveats, the English story is a positive one that U.S. 
policymakers can learn from. First, performance accountability based is merely a means to convince 
colleges to focus their resources on outcomes deemed important by external stakeholders. 
Performance accountability policies are typically unsuccessful when colleges are coerced into 
compliance, or if they think the performance indicators or performance targets to be unreasonable. 
Policy mandates cannot increase student success alone; before any dramatic gains in student success, 
colleges must internalize the value of student success. My informal interviews with policymakers and 
college presidents in England convinced me that English policy was successful in convincing 
colleges to internalize the importance of student success. 
In England the report Unfinished Business (Audit Commission & Office for Standards in 
Education, 1993), which showed the low retention and success rates in further education colleges, 
was instrumental in convincing college administrators and faculty that these problems needed urgent 
repair. Furthermore, equity funding components, such as the disadvantage uplift and ALS funding, 
show college administrators that the government is a reasonable partner and that it will provide the 
additional resources to make student success a reality. By contrast, U.S. policies which demand 
better student outcomes without additional funding that considers educational inputs have been 
viewed with skepticism (Burke & Associates, 2002; Dougherty & Hong, 2005; Harbour & Nagy, 
2005).  
Although the English story is a positive one, a note of caution is necessary. Since the 2002–
03 academic year, the English government has increasingly coerced further education colleges to 
serve national economic ends. England has a centralized, as opposed to federalized, system of 
governance and the central government controls nearly all funding for further education colleges. In 
2001 the Department of Education was merged with the Department of Employment to become 
the Department for Education and Skills (DfES). The recent education policies of the DfES—for 
example raising fees, cutting funding for adult education, and pressuring colleges to provide training 
in certain industries (Department for Education and Skills, 2003)– are clearly economically 
motivated and are resented by many colleges as an infringement on autonomy and a diminished 
commitment to disadvantaged students. In the coming years the coalition between colleges and the 
government may crumble. A more thorough discussion is outside a scope of this paper, but one 
general insight emerges; although centralized education policy can make impressive progress, it can 
also be hijacked by a narrow economic focus which can hurt the system in the long run. The 
emerging story will be interesting to watch. 
The final policy lesson from this research concerns the use of market-based policies—
specifically voucher systems—in education. Interestingly, voucher systems in education were first 
theorized by American economist Milton Friedman (1955)  and first implemented by U.S. school 
districts (Halsey, Lauder, Phillip, & Stuart Wells, 1997). English further education colleges are 
funded through a national voucher system in which funding follows students to whatever institution 
they decide to attend. Similar voucher systems are used to fund English compulsory education 
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(Glennerster, 2002), and compulsory education in Belgium (Vandenberghe, 1998), and Sweden 
(Lundahl, 2002).  
Despite their widespread use in other countries, voucher systems have not taken root in U.S. 
education, and the voucher debate remains polemical. Some critics contend that voucher systems 
will only exacerbate social stratification (Newman, Couturier, & Scurry, 2004). Indeed, this can be 
true. For example, the new voucher system for higher education in Colorado pays a flat rate to all 
residents, which wealthy families may use to supplement their existing income (Harbour et al., 2006).  
Clearly, voucher systems pose legitimate questions of concern. Will for-profit institutions be 
eligible for voucher funding? Will religious institutions be eligible for voucher funding, thereby 
diluting the separation between church and state? What about the stratification of educational 
achievement? School choice tends to create a sorting hat where the best students—typically having 
the most informed and engaged parents—are concentrated in the same schools while the worst 
students are concentrated in others (Vandenberghe, 1998). Indeed, this has been a problem in 
English compulsory education (Ball et al., 2000). However, does this problem persist in adult 
education, where there are often few affordable providers within a reasonable geographic distance?  
On the other hand, voucher systems can tailor funding to individualized student needs in a 
way that block funding cannot. Depending on the particular funding formula used, voucher systems 
can exacerbate educational inequalities or they can promote educational equality. The English 
voucher system promotes vertical equity. It pays tuition for disadvantaged students and, as Figure 1 
showed, colleges receive more funding for enrolling students that require additional resources to be 
successful. 
In conclusion, this research calls for a more nuanced discussion of voucher systems in 
education. Voucher systems are policy tools that give institutions incentives to achieve outcomes 
that are rewarded by the funding formula. They are neither inherently good nor inherently bad; the 
policy details matter a great deal. 
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Appendix 
Table A-1 
Sample Size: Qualifications by Year and Subgroup 
 
Variable 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03
Overall  1,509,393 1,687,464 1,692,394 1,646,138 1,771,842
Deprivation Index      
Deprivation LT 10 329,810 365,731 365,396 369,394 371,588
Deprivation 10-<20 436,658 483,795 480,302 470,287 491,029
Deprivation 20-<30 278,732 309,921 307,696 295,890 317,918
Deprivation 35-<50 322,034 362,924 366,418 349,254 396,008
Deprivation 50+ 142,159 165,093 172,582 161,313 195,299
Ethnicity      
Bangladeshi 7,755 9,114 10,295 11,604 15,677
Black-African 33,780 38,409 45,118 49,322 64,450
Black-Caribbean 30,092 33,403 31,710 34,666 41,738
Black-Other 11,243 12,882 13,599 10,587 11,632
Chinese 8,899 10,437 9,944 9,665 12,785
Indian 29,268 37,855 35,799 35,916 43,477
Pakistani 31,013 33,540 35,455 34,505 40,668
White 1,177,380 1,260,058 1,210,861 1,129,889 1,311,190
Asian-Other 17,681 23,764 29,420 30,670 36,637
Gender      
Male 569,048 631,287 636,922 626,456 673,948
Female 940,345 1,056,177 1,055,472 1,019,682 1,097,894
Age      
Age 19–25 363,485 390,459 388,885 367,617 412,494
Age 26–34 426,861 454,255 434,282 394,028 418,390
Age 35–44 378,978 424,700 421,507 403,925 426,266
Age 45–54 221,082 255,302 257,197 256,781 261,555
Age 55+ 118,987 162,748 190,523 223,787 253,137
Disabled 83,927 108,009 139,531 157,727 204,372
Qualification levela      
Entry & level 1 439,825 621,675 624,377 619,177 858,984
Level 2 372,908 476,299 448,887 431,416 434,292
Level 3 272,344 322,010 318,419 293,362 294,696
Level 4 or Higher 51,581 36,115 31,324 25,233 34,092
Other 372,735 231,365 269,387 276,950 149,778
External assessment  
Not externally assessed 331,466 164,134 199,966 293,008 448,577
Externally assessed 1,177,927 1,523,330 1,492,428 1,353,130 1,323,265
Qualification duration  
LT 24 Weeks 494,352 603,543 641,736 659,468 748,634
24-<48 Weeks 830,882 875,065 861,214 818,652 844,314
48+ Weeks 184,159 208,856 189,444 168,018 178,894
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Variable 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03
 
Mode of attendance  
Full-time, full-year 302,482 323,105 312,304 285,149 319,136
Full-time, part-year 82,854 98,716 111,348 118,090 114,797
Part-time 1,124,057 1,265,643 1,268,742 1,242,899 1,337,909
Open/distance learning 83,674 61,012 78,916 123,820 127,065
Funding Determinants  
Receive access fundingb 70,526 74,232 149,949
Postcode disadvantage uplift 440,432 454,575 451,883 429,449 516,141
On benefit 254,439 276,424 253,293 226,068 271,579
ABE student 119,546 149,385 155,942 160,031 243,046
Asylum seeker 5,438 14,197 24,311 27,710 35,323
Additional Learning Support 81,054 105,700 133,967 127,717 164,280
a Qualification level in 2002–03 not comparable to previous years due to change in definitions for 
how qualification level was defined.  
b The access funding program did not begin until the 2000–01 academic year 
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Table A-2 
Full-Model Regression Results  
 
Variable 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 
Socioeconomic determinants      
Deprivation (ref = LT 10)      
Deprivation 10-<20 0.96*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 
Deprivation 20-<30 0.90*** 0.88*** 0.86*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 
Deprivation 30-<50 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.78*** 0.81*** 0.82*** 
Deprivation 50+ 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.71*** 0.75*** 0.77*** 
Female 1.25*** 1.20*** 1.20*** 1.18*** 1.21*** 
Disabled 0.93*** 0.98 0.93*** 0.89*** 0.97*** 
Ethnicity (ref= white)      
Asian-other 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.77*** 
Bangladeshi 0.81*** 0.75*** 0.80*** 0.83*** 0.92*** 
Black-African 0.74*** 0.82*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.74*** 
Black-Caribbean 0.72*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.71*** 
Black-other 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.69*** 
Chinese 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.87*** 
Indian 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.95*** 1.00 
Pakistani 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.64*** 0.77*** 0.81*** 
Age (ref= 19–25)      
Age 26–34 1.17*** 1.20*** 1.25*** 1.28*** 1.26*** 
Age 35–44 1.28*** 1.32*** 1.39*** 1.44*** 1.44*** 
Age 45–54 1.17*** 1.21*** 1.30*** 1.38*** 1.45*** 
Age 55+ 0.93*** 1.05*** 1.13*** 1.27*** 1.43*** 
Region (ref= South East)      
East Anglia 1.00 1.05*** 1.10*** 0.90*** 0.93*** 
East Midlands 1.17*** 1.27*** 1.12*** 1.09*** 1.07*** 
Greater London 0.86*** 0.94*** 1.07*** 0.91*** 1.01 
North East 1.21*** 1.35*** 1.57*** 1.22*** 1.10*** 
North West 1.02 1.24*** 1.38*** 1.28*** 1.16*** 
South West 1.23*** 1.18*** 1.19*** 1.09*** 1.05*** 
West Midlands 1.12*** 1.24*** 1.25*** 1.11*** 1.03*** 
Yorkshire Humberside 1.14*** 1.20*** 1.26*** 1.06*** 1.04*** 
Qualification determinants      
Qualification levela 
(ref = level 1) 
     
Level 2 1.09*** 1.02*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.91*** 
Level 3 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.15*** 1.09*** 1.00 
Level 4 & 5 1.07*** 0.80*** 0.75*** 0.78*** 0.86*** 
Other level 1.49*** 1.48*** 1.37*** 0.92*** 1.47*** 
Externally assessed 
 
 
0.82*** 0.88*** 0.92*** 0.68*** 0.70*** 
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Variable 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 
Area of learning 
(ref= tourism/hospitality)  
     
ABE 0.82*** 0.77*** 0.97 0.90*** 0.71*** 
Agriculture 0.72*** 0.81*** 0.64*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 
Art & design 0.68*** 0.65*** 0.73*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 
Business 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.92*** 0.71*** 0.84*** 
Construction 1.05* 0.98 1.01 0.91*** 0.79*** 
Engineering 0.96* 0.81*** 0.95** 1.04 0.93*** 
Health & care 1.21*** 1.06*** 1.16*** 1.07*** 1.14*** 
Humanities 0.66*** 0.60*** 0.65*** 0.55*** 0.58*** 
Science, math, IT 0.68*** 0.60*** 0.66*** 0.54*** 0.61*** 
Qualification type (ref= “other”)      
A/AS 0.62*** 0.55*** 0.67*** 0.77*** 0.82*** 
GNVQ 0.84*** 0.94* 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.93* 
HE access 1.04 0.83*** 0.89*** 0.92*** 0.90*** 
NVQ 0.74*** 0.67*** 0.61*** 0.64*** 0.69*** 
pre GNVQ 1.11*** 1.02*** 0.88*** 0.82*** 1.12*** 
Student mode of attendance 
(ref= full-time full-year) 
     
Full-time part-year 1.06*** 1.14*** 1.32*** 1.47*** 1.29*** 
Part-time 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.99 1.06*** 0.96*** 
Qualification duration 
(ref= LT 24 weeks) 
     
24-<48 weeks 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.63*** 0.56*** 0.61*** 
48+ weeks 0.51*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.38*** 0.47*** 
Open/distance education 0.64*** 0.79*** 0.65*** 0.50*** 0.55*** 
Dedicated employer provision 0.89*** 1.13*** 1.50*** 1.41*** 1.88*** 
Employee release 1.28*** 1.19*** 1.30*** 1.38*** 1.48*** 
Qual is not highest level taken 1.20*** 1.23*** 1.17*** 1.14*** 1.00 
Institution level determinants      
College size (ref= LT 15,000)      
15,000–25,000 students 1.02* 0.94*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.89*** 
8,000–15,000 students 0.99 0.99 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.90*** 
GT 25,000 students 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.83*** 0.89*** 
Population density (ref= urban)      
Rural 0.98 1.00 1.03*** 1.06*** 1.06*** 
Town 0.99 0.98* 1.01 1.06*** 1.03*** 
Tertiary college (ref= general further 
education college) 
1.06*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 0.90*** 0.99 
Funding determinantsb      
Postcode disadvantage uplift 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.97*** 0.98*** 
Additional learning support 1.31*** 1.26*** 1.24*** 1.43*** 1.52*** 
Access fundingc   1.00 0.98 1.13*** 
Means tested benefit 0.69*** 0.71*** 0.75*** 0.80*** 0.73*** 
Basic skills learner 0.81*** 0.91*** 1.08*** 1.08*** 1.16*** 
Asylum seeker 0.85*** 0.71*** 0.90*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 
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Variable 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 
Program weighting factor 
(ref = A = 1.00) 
     
B=1.12 1.06*** 1.04*** 1.15*** 1.07*** 1.00 
C=1.3 0.94*** 1.05*** 1.21*** 1.05*** 1.17*** 
D=1.6 0.85*** 0.90*** 1.19*** 0.86*** 1.10*** 
E=1.72 0.95 0.88* 1.47*** 1.21*** 1.10* 
F=1.4 0.70*** 0.78*** 0.65*** 0.69*** 0.87*** 
Model Fit Statistics      
Number of cases 1,244,985 1,608,931 1,622,600 1,629,278 1,771,656
Raw student success rate 56.4% 59.6% 61.8% 64.2% 66.9% 
-2 log L 1,619,075 2,073,899 2,055,472 1,997,139 2,121,875
Pseudo r-square 0.09 0.079 0.084 0.104 0.096 
Chi-square 86,148 96,399 103,144 128,778 126,941 
Degrees of freedom 74 74 75 75 75 
a Percentages for 2002–03 not comparable to previous years due to change in definitions for how 
qualification level was defined. 
b The reference group for each funding determinant is qualifications not having that characteristic. 
For example, the odds ratio for Additional Learning Support shows the regression adjusted odds of 
success in comparison to qualifications that do not receive Additional Learning Support. 
c The access funding program did not begin until the 2000–01 academic year 
* p<.01, ** p<.001, *** p<.0001 
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